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Audrey Macklin* Law Reform Error:
Retry or Abort?**
I. Introduction
The void left by the demise of the Law Reform Commission of Canada
(LRCC) in 1991 presents an opportunity to rethink the scope and
legitimacy of law reform as it has been conceptualized and practised by
academic lawyers. I am concerned that the dominant meaning ascribed to
the term "federal law reform" under the tenure of the LRCC was partial,
inadequate, and ultimately conservatizing in its influence. In reviewing
past commentary on law reform in Canada, I have been struck by the
recurring themes that emerged from the literature.) I was particularly
impressed by an exceptional piece written by the late Dalhousie scholar,
Professor Robert Samek, entitled "Social Law Reform."' 2 What I hope to
offer is a somewhat updated perspective on what ailed institutional law
reform efforts in the past and what we might do differently in the future.
My thesis can be tersely stated: the Law Reform Commission of
Canada presented itself as a disinterested independent agency promoting
a neutral brand of reform for the common weal; on my analysis, the LRCC
was, in large measure, a rational actor in the judicia/legislative political
arena whose conception of law reform and its proper institutional role
served to advance its own interests as a legal bureaucracy. This charac-
terization of the former LRCC in turn grounds my proposals for innova-
tions that deliberately destabilize the personnel, process and objects of
federal law reform in order to render it a more inclusive, socially useful
and self-conscious interest group.
My method is to disaggregate the three component parts of the phrase
"federal law reform" and consider how the interpretation given each of
these by the former LRCC advanced certain institutional and political
interests. Before proceeding further, I wish to express two caveats: first,
Dalhousie Law School
** The following is a revised version of a paper presented at the "Conference on the Scope and
Direction of Federal Law Reform", Halifax, Nova Scotia, March 25-26,1993. The Conference
was organized by the Atlantic Institute of Criminology and sponsored by the federal Depart-
ment of Justice as a vehicle for soliciting views from various constituencies on future options
for law reform efforts.
1. See, e.g., Noel Lyon, "Law Reform Needs Reform" (1974), 12 Osgoode Hall .J. 421.
2. (1977), 55 Can. B. Rev. 409.
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I have never participated directly in any federal law reform activities. My
comments are derived from an "outsider" perspective based on limited
information about the LRCC's past policies and practices. Second, the
examples I use to illustrate my points will be drawn from areas that are
familiar to me, which does not suggest that they are the only or even the
most urgent problems to be addressed.
II. Federal
As lawyers, our understanding of what is federal (as opposed to provin-
cial) is derived from ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.1 Our
understanding of why the distinction matters for purposes of law reform
is less clear. Social problems do not respect the constitutional division of
powers. My impression however, is that law reform agendas were set by
the LRCC not only in terms of the urgency of a given legal or social
problem, but also by reference to how tidily the problem would fit into the
compartment labelled "federal" under s. 91 of the the Constitution Act,
1867. Two instrumental reasons come to mind: the Commission may
have worried that the federal government would have looked askance at
expending its resources on thinking about how to make provincial laws
better; by the same token, some provinces may have resented the
intervention of a federal agency into the domain of its jurisdiction.
This obsession about jurisdiction can generate at least three distortions
in the range of inquiry. First, the agenda may be dominated by issues that
are uncontroversially within the federal power, such as general principles
of criminal law and procedure. While I do not mean to diminish the
importance of criminal law, its representation on the list of reports and
working papers is utterly disproportionate according to any standard
against which one measures priority social concerns. According to a
survey conducted by Professor Teresa Scassa, over 70% of the LRCC
publications concerned criminal law.4 It is also notable that criminal law
was the only subject area that garnered the sustained attention of the
LRCC over the course of its history. The obverse proposition is simply
that important issues never get tackled at all, or only addressed in a
desultory manner because they slop over too obviously into non-federal
arenas. Another disappointing feature of the LRCC agenda was its
unresponsiveness to public expressions of priority. In its First Annual
3. R.S.C. 1985, Appendix 11, No. 5.
4. Teresa Scassa, "A Critical Overview of the Work of the Law Reform Commission of
Canada: Learning from the Past", Federal Law Reform Conference Final Report (Halifax:
Atlantic Institute of Criminology Occasional Paper Series, 1993), Appendix C at 4.
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Report, the LRCC disclosed that public consultations revealed that
"family law warranted a greater emphasis than we had originally ex-
pected to give it."5 In the ensuing years, the LRCC devoted minimal time
(1974-76) and minimal resources (5% of all reports and working papers)
to family law. As Professor Scassa trenchantly observes, "[o]ne wonders
whose 'widespread expectations' focussed on criminal law, and why the
'we' of the law reform commission underestimated or undervalued
public concern with family law reform."'6
A second distortion arises when problems that do not comfortably fit
within s. 91 are crammed into it anyway, thus truncating and narrowing
the focus of the inquiry. For example, the Working Paper evocatively
entitled Crimes Against the Foetus,7 proceeded with hardly a moment's
hesitation to the conclusion that the criminal law was the optimal means
of dealing with the pressing social issue of abortion. Part of this orienta-
tion may be explained by the predilections of individual Commission
members and/or their collective failure to think of another federal head
of power under which non-criminal federal legislation could bejustified.8
More importantly, it may also have signalled an institutional inability or
unwillingness to even contemplate a resolution that was not clearly
within federal power, even if such a proposal was otherwise meritorious.
In a similar vein, the Working Paper came up with its recommendations
about time limits within which abortions should be obtainable without
any attention whatsoever to factors outside the federal domain that might
account for delay in seeking an abortion, such as provincial refusal in such
places as Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island to provide abortion
services or lack of health care services in remote areas across the country.
The tenor of the Working Paper simply assumes that the problem to be
addressed is that women wilfully and capriciously delay obtaining safe,
timely abortions, a course of conduct that warranted criminalization
rather than, say, a co-ordinated strategy of recommendations that ad-
dressed access problems at the provincial level. In the end, the LRCC's
proposals on abortion not only reaffirmed the primacy of federal law in
the area of abortion, they also had the indirect effect of validating the
choice of a federal agency to address the issue.
5. Law Reform Commission of Canada, FirstAnnualReport, 1971-72 (Ottawa: LRCC, 1972)
at 5, quoted in Scassa, supra, note 4.
6. Ibid., at2.
7. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Crimes Against the Foetus (Working Paper 58)
(Ottawa: LRCC, 1989) at 45-47. All references are to English text only.
8. See Moira McConnell & Lorenne Clark, "Abortion Law in Canada: A Matter of National
Concern" (1991. 14 Dalhousie L.J. 81.
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Third, the understanding of "federal" as that which is contained in s. 91
of the Constitution Act, 1867, ignores another important function of the
central government in a federal state, which is the co-ordination of
provincial and federal laws in areas of overlapping jurisdiction. Family
law (broadly construed) is one example where the federal governmenthas
jurisdiction over certain areas (solemnization of marriage, divorce,
custody maintenance upon divorce), while the provinces legislate in
matters relating to division of property. In its First Annual Report, the
Commissioners emphasized the "need for close co-operation between the
federal Law Reform Commission and the provincial commissions"9 in
areas of concurrent or complementary jurisdiction, especially family and
criminal law. Indeed, the Report contains references to meetings between
the federal LRCC and the provincial counterparts where there was
apparently "unanimous accord that the law reform bodies in Canada
should work closely together."' 10 Subsequent working papers and reports
on such matters of joint concern as spousal maintenance upon marriage
breakdown" are notable for their failure to indicate any co-operative
effort between federal and provincial commissions. Indeed, the authors
of these reports inevitably begin or end with a disclaimer (expressed with
varying degrees of frustration) to the effect that the efficacy of federal
reform is limited without reform at the provincial level." Talk about
understatement. It is all the more ironic because family law cries out for
both co-ordination between the federal and provincial governments and
co-ordination between provinces to reduce the conflicts-of-laws prob-
lems that plague parents, ex-spouses and children. It seems entirely
appropriate for a federal law reform body to act as facilitator between
provincial commissions for purposes of minimizing interprovincial con-
flicts (if not harmonizing substantive legal rules), yet this does not appear
to be a role that the LRCC wished to undertake. Facilitating co-operation
and harmony in respect of other people's laws is certainly less glamorous
for a reformer than dreaming up new and better laws, but I suggest it might
have been more productive to the women, children and men who find
themselves enmeshed in the destructive machinery that is family law. I
am not privy to the reasons behind the deterioration of the relationship
between the federal and provincial law reform bodies; my point is that a
9. First Annual Report, supra, note 5 at 17.
10. Ibid., at 18.
11. e.g. Maintenance on Divorce (Working Paper 12) (Ottawa: LRCC, 1975); Divorce
(Working Paper 13) (Ottawa: LRCC, 1975); Enforcement of Maintenance Orders (Study
Paper No. 8) n.d.
12. See, e.g., Enforcement ofMaintenance Orders, ibid., at 2;Maintenance on Divorce, ibid.,
at 40.
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pre-requisite to any future success requires the various actors to co-
operate, or for the federal body to go it alone if necessary and approach
issues holistically, instead of hiving them off into artificial "water-tight"
compartments.
El. Law
The purpose of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, as described in
its enabling statute, was "to study and keep under review on a continuing
and systematic basis the statutes and other laws comprising the laws of
Canada."' 3 A review of the Commission's work over the years suggests
that the evil to be remedied is either flawed legislation, inconsistent
common law doctrine or the lack of legislation. The cure invariably
prescribed is more legislation. While I think this is a defensible position
in some or many instances, it also represents a shallow understanding of
what "law" is. To put it another way, lawyers think that law is what it says.
For everyone else, "law is what it does. 1 4 The chasm between the
legalistic and pragmatic conception of law is most graphically repre-
sented by feminist analyses of such phenomena as sexual assault and
woman abuse. If one takes into account the barriers to charging, prosecu-
tion, conviction and sentencing confronting survivors of these offences,
it seems clear that many women do not experience the benefit of formal
legal prohibition of abuse by those closest to them. To the extent that law
is only animated through the agency of police, the judiciary, lawyers and
correctional officials, there is no "law" to speak of when the actors in the
system fail or refuse to activate the rule on paper. I appreciate that we as
lawyers are accustomed to distinguishing between "law" and "enforce-
ment". I am suggesting here that the distinction is overstated if we
understand "law" from the perspective of those subject to it and who seek
its protection.
A timely illustration of my point concerns the passage of the recent
"anti-stalking" legislation, now s. 264 of the Criminal Code. '5 The social
problem that inspired the new law was the practice by certain men of
following, harassing and otherwise menacing women who had once been
intimate partners. Critics of the status quo were right to complain that
there was no law protecting women from being terrorized by their
boyfriends and husbands, but wrong to blame the putative absence of
13. Law Reform Commission Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.23 (1st Supp), s.1 1.
14. Samek, supra, note 2 at 411.
15. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended by Bill C-126, An Act to Amend the
Criminal Code and the Young Offenders Act.
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legislation forbidding it. Section 423 of the Criminal Code creates the
offence of intimidation which, though imperfect, 16 offers the potential of
offering substantive protection. Section 372 (conveying harassing or
indecent telephone calls) also has application. There are, of course,
restraining orders and peace bonds which are supposed to protect women
(if they can obtain them), but these are also notoriously ineffective at all
stages from police response to prosecution to sentencing to monitoring. 17
If one seriously wants to reform the "law" regarding stalking of
women, formulating a new law would only comprise a small part of the
task and would, in my view, be a futile and counterproductive exercise if
taken in isolation. It is futile because it would not do a damn bit of good
and it is also counterproductive because it would create a false sense in
the mind of the public (minus the women affected by it) that something
had actually been done. To an extent, the problem I have identified here
overlaps with the federalism concerns identified earlier.
This self-induced myopia of conventional "law reformers" also mani-
fests in other ways. I noted earlier the preponderance of criminal law and
procedure as the law dujour on the LRCC menu. Why not unemployment
insurance? Why not substantive immigration law, or labour law, or
environmental law, or competition law? It is certainly the case that the
Commission has historically been comprised of people with a criminal
law slant, which quite naturally results in the identification of criminal
law as the area most urgently in need of reform. Moreover, my hunch is
thatthe Commission considered thatresolution of the competing interests
and concerns in these areas to belong more to the realm of "politics" than
"hard law". Nothing supports such a distinction, except the self-interest
of Commissioners in appearing to be non-partisan and non-political by
16. Flaws include the following: it is only a summary conviction offence, it is contained in
Part X ("Fraudulent Transactions Relating to Contracts and Trade") rather than Part VIII
("Offences Against the Person and Reputation"), and it requires proof that the accused had the
purpose of compelling another person to do or abstain from doing anything the other person
had a legal right to do or not do. The apparent origins of the provision seem to be related to
restricting union activity, but at least one court has found that the provision is not confined to
industrial disputes: R. v. Basaraba (1975), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 296 (Man.CA).
17. Andre Picard, "Justice System Fails Stalked Women", Globe & Mail, March 9,1993, A4.
After a year of violence, Marjolaine Landry pressed charges against her mate after he pulled
her around the apartment by the hair and nearly choked her to death. J.R. Lepage pleaded guilty
to assault, was fined $200 and put on probation for a year. The couple reconciled, he eventually
recommenced beating her, she fled. He stalked her, threatened her, smashed the windshield of
her car. She had him charged, the court issued a peace bond against him and ordered him to turn
in any weapons, but the police actually refused to take his pistol because the computer said he
had no record. He continued to terrorize her, andpolice claimed they could do nothing to protect
her. A few days later, Lepage emptied his .38 calibre revolver into Ms. Landry's car at an
intersection, killing Landry's sister and injuring a friend.
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confining themselves to a subject area where political choices can be
buried in the abstraction of "general principles", precedent and hoary
doctrines that have been around so long that they are treated as having
spontaneously generated out of the word "justice".
A few years ago, Professor Christine Boyle challenged this very
pretence of neutrality that the LRCC endeavoured to convey through the
articulation of abstract principles of criminal liability either in respect of
specific offences or the "General Part." 8 I share and adopt her position
that "analytical clarity is a problematic value, especially when presented
as something worth pursuing in a vacuum."19 Selecting the Report on
Contempt of Court2" as one of a myriad of possible examples, she notes
the utter failure of the Report to consider gender bias among the judiciary
and the impact of the Report's recommendations with respect to it.
Commenting on Working Paper 29, The General Part - Liability and
Defences, 21 Boyle observes how "mistake of fact, self-defence and
necessity are all discussed as if reality were gender neutral and no concern
need be expressed about the impact on women of the abstractions
discussed and proposed."2 Similarly, rules for the intoxication defence
are assessed and proposed without any reference to the real costs imposed
by the preferred rule on, say, women who are sexually assaulted by
drunken assailants. To the extent that the LRCC was able to pursue a goal
of uniformity and consistency and represent its views as a consensus, it
did so by by creating an institutional legal ethos that exalted internal
purity, formal equality and uniformity over other values, such as the
responsiveness of law to the social context from which law emerges and
into which it speaks. In the process, it silenced all other perspectives.
Now, reasonable people may hold quite different visions of law's
purpose and, by extension, the standard against one measures its quality.
The fact is, however, that the LRCC embraced a single, totalizing theory
to the exclusion of virtually all others. This perspective on law is
manifested most clearly in its work on the General Part.3 I believe it is
18. Christine Boyle, "Criminal Law and Procedure: Who Needs Tenure?" (1985), 23
Osgoode Hall L.J. 427.
19. Ibid., at 433.
20. Contempt of Court: Offences Against the Administration of Justice (Working Paper 20)
(Ottawa: LRCC, 1977).
21. (Ottawa: LRCC, 1982). The subject eventually evolved into Recodifying Criminal Law
(Report 30) (Ottawa: LRCC, 1986) and Recodifying Criminal Law: Revised and Enlarged
Edition (Report 31) (Ottawa: LRCC, 1987).
22. Boyle, supra, note 18 at 436.
23. See documents cited supra, note 21.
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fair to say that the Commission believed they would be formulating
general principles of liability for which exceptions could be made for
specific offences. Returning to the topic of defences in criminal law, for
example, it is possible that they may have eventually countenanced a
reconsideration of the role of intoxication defence in sexual assault, but
only if absolutely necessary, and only as an exceptional measure. The
problem with this approach is that if one requires an independent
justification for departing from a set of general rules that facilitate the
abuse of large numbers of women and children, who in turn comprise
more than half the population, then I want to know what and who law
reformers were thinking about and not thinking about when they settled
on the "general" rule. Alternatively, I would challenge the privileging of
generality and consistency across offences as a virtue that presumptively
prevails over other competing values.
I would be remiss if I did not temper my criticism with a recognition
of the last report issued by the LRCC, Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal
Justice.24 In many ways, it represents a bold and commendable attempt to
depart from the strictures of past reform efforts. It genuinely attempts to
wrestle with the specificity of aboriginal people's encounters with the
criminal justice system. It should not escape notice, however, that the
Law Reform Commission had to be pushed into this project through a
Minister's Reference.' The Report indicates that the LRCC was demon-
strably lukewarm to a methodology that challenged their adherence to a
view of law as a set of abstract neutral principles subject only to the
principle of formal equality:
Throughout our work we have extolled the virtues of a uniform, consistent
and comprehensive approach to law reform. This Reference calls for us to
examine, in specific detail, one group of persons and its interaction and
unique difficulties with the criminal justice system.... While we remain
committed to the principles of uniformity and consistency, distinct treat-
ment might be constitutionally justified on the basis of sections 25 and 35
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which put Aboriginal
peoples in a unique constitutional position with pre-existing legal rights,
or else under the affirmative action clause of the Charter's equality
provision. 26
24. Report 34 (Ottawa: LRCC, 1991).
25. Mr. Stan Cohen, formerly of the LRCC, assured me that the Commission had wanted to
embark on a project of this nature much earlier, but restrained itself because of uncertainty
about whether their statutory mandate would permit such an inquiry absent governmental
sanction. While this may vindicate the Law Reform Commission's inaction, it raises equally
serious and troubling questions about the independence of the Commission from government.
26. Supra, note 24 at 1.
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One would think that one had to seek permission under the Constitu-
tion to use a real group of people and their real life experience as the
organizing principle for inquiry as opposed to an ostensibly genderless,
raceless, faceless doctrine. Nobody, but the Commission itself, imposed
that constraint on the scope of inquiry, and I can only guess that it did so
to vindicate its own long-standing ideological commitment to a particular
vision of law.
IV. Refonn
In its Second Annual Report, the Commission described its mandate as
follows:
"Bad laws", said Burke, "are the worst form of tyranny". They are a
tyranny every freedom-loving nation must fight to prevent. And they are
a tyranny the Law Reform Commission of Canada was expressly designed
to combat."'27
Accepting for the moment the narrow definition of law at work here,
various questions come to mind: are bad laws always the worst form of
tyranny? Are they invariably worse than the tyranny of good (or at least
adequate) laws ignored? Or good laws in the hands of bad decision
makers? Is more law the best response to bad law? If you want to change
the "law", changing the words on paper is only one way, and not
necessarily the optimal way. Where the injustice experienced by a
particular group is related to systemic oppression, it is reasonable to
suppose that that status of disadvantage permeates all elements of the
system, and altering words on paper typically produces little change, or
else, generates new counter-strategies to neutralize any positive effects
and maintain the status quo. That is why introducing a new and improved
stalking law may well turn out to be a waste of time. Police officers will
still have latitude to decide whether to arrest, prosecutors will still
exercise discretion about whether to prosecute,28 and judges will still
bring whatever gender biases they possessed prior to passage of the
legislation, to bear on statutory interpretation, fact finding and the
sentencing process.
27. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Second Annual Report, 1972-73 (Ottawa: LRCC,
1973) at 7.
28. One of the complaints about the existing provision on intimidation is that is strictly a
summary conviction offence. The new stalking offence is a hybrid offence, thus suggesting that
it has the potential to result in more serious penalties. While this is true in theory, given the
practice of plea bargaining and the general trivialization of harms done to women, itis far from
clear that actual sentencing for convictions obtained under the new stalking law will reflect the
allegedly greater severity of the crime.
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The identity of decision makers who interpret and apply law is of
course crucial to the concrete meaning of law in the real world. One route
to changing law is to change the personnel who interpret and apply it. In
one of my research areas (immigration), the correlation between the
method of appointment (patronage) and the quality of decision making by
the Immigration and Refugee Board is widely seen to be very strong and
very negative. Consider this: I recently spoke to an immigration lawyer
about the new guidelines regarding the admission of women refugees on
grounds of gender persecution.2 9 He was uncharacteristically optimistic
about the impact of the new guidelines, but when asked whether he really
believed that the guidelines would be followed by decision makers, he
readily conceded that he anticipated strong resistance among Immigra-
tion and Refugee Board members. His optimism was based on his
assessment that he would be able to take one of the negative decisions
from a Board and successfully challenge it before the Federal Court. He
had little confidence in the quality of the front line people appointed to
make decisions even when confronted with guidelines instructing them
on why and how to take women refugee claims seriously. Of course, it is
also the case that he was compelled to put his faith in another group of
appointees.
I was startled to discover that the LRCC had never undertaken any
projectlooking into judicial and administrative appointments with a view
to promoting integrity in the selection process and equity in the outcome.
Upon reflection, it occurred to me that acknowledging the role these
actors make in law-creation implicitly decentres legislative reform as the
sine qua non of legal change, which in turn undermines the long run
legitimacy of the Commission itself as an agent of legislative reform.30
Events in recent years around abortion in Canada also raise interesting
questions about reform. For the last couple of years, Canada has had no
federal law regulating abortion.31 It seems to me that there have been no
significant problems arising out of the failure of the state to regulate
women's choice to seek an abortion. Compared to anything else I've seen
thatmight arguably meet the constitutional pre-requisites of Morgentaler,32
29. "Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution", Guidelines Issued by
the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act (Ottawa: Immigration and
Refugee Board, March 9, 1993).
30. I say this with awareness that the LRCC is generally perceived to have actually had little
effect on legislative reform to any significant degree.
31. The attempt by the Nova Scotia government to restrict access to abortion services through
provincial legislation was recently declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court of Canada: R. v.
Morgentaler, File No. 22578, September 30, 1993 (unreported).
32. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
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no law seems to be the best abortion law around. At no point did the LRCC
entertain this possibility. Perhaps it simply distrusted women too much
to permit such "lawlessness". Perhaps it could not afford to confront the
humbling reality that law per se can be more of an obstacle than a path
toward social change.33 On the other hand, I believe that the Report on
Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice discloses a nascent ambiva-
lence about the virtues of expanding rather than contracting the domain
of law. The Commission begins its series of recommendations with the
following finding:
The criminal justice system must provide the same minimum level of
service to all people and must treat Aboriginal persons equitably and with
respect. To achieve these objectives, the cultural distinctiveness of Ab-
original peoples should be recognized, respected and, where appropriate,
incorporated into the criminal justice system.34
The Commission's second recommendation states as follows:
Aboriginal communities identified by the legitimate representatives of
Aboriginal peoples as being willing and capable should have the authority
to establish Aboriginaljustice systems. The federal and provincial govern-
ments should enter into negotiations to transfer that authority to those
Aboriginal communities.3
The Report then goes on to make thoughtful and useful recommenda-
tions touching on virtually all aspects of the criminal justice system from
policing to trial to corrections, in a mission that might loosely be
described as institutional (as opposed to doctrinal) reform. All of these are
in furtherance of the first recommendation, which I would label "reform-
ist". Few of them are entirely novel. Inquiries from Nova Scotia to
Alberta have traversed similar terrain, as have various academics, re-
searchers and advocates. 36
33. Samek expressed a similar point in terms ofthe lawyerly mind: "Forhim [sic], the stability
of law is a necessary and usually a sufficient condition of the stability of any society, and
essential to the survival of the individual's composing it. That the stability of law may beamyth
to cloak the instability of society is a thought which does not normally cross his mind, for he
has been taught that law is the cement which holds society together, and this dogma is enshrined
in the prevailing ideology and reinforced, consciously or not, by his self-interest. Being so
conditioned, he cannot begin to grasp that fundamental social ills may not be amenable to legal
cures, that legal reform does not entail social reform, and that what may be wrong with society
is an underlying ideology which cannot be changed on its own terms." Samek, supra, note 2
at 421.
34. Supra, note 24 at 95.
35. Ibid.
36. For a survey of the various commissions of inquiry, task forces and other studies into
Aboriginal justice issues conducted up to the end of 1991, see H. Archibald Kaiser, "The
Criminal Code of Canada: A Review Based on the Minister's Reference", [1992] U.B.C. Law
Rev. (Special Edition) 41 at 65-76.
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On the other hand, we hear absolutely nothing more about the impli-
cations of the second recommendation about handing over power to
Aboriginal people, a proposal which I believe could be regarded as
"transformative". The LRCC could not and did not ignore the voices of
Aboriginal peoples themselves who "conveyed a deep sense of the futility
in attempting to change the face of the criminal justice system when
broader, more fundamental social change is necessary. 3 7 Elsewhere, the
Commission acknowledged that "Aboriginal peoples have consistently
voiced their desire to establish systems of justice that incorporate their
own values, customs, traditions and beliefs but that permit the adaptation
of these features to the realities of the modem age."3 Yet the force of this
recognition is effectively marginalized by orienting virtually all of the
recommendations toward reform of the current system. The Commission's
position appeared to go something like this: 'Aboriginal autonomy is the
long term ideal, but in the short run, we should make the present system
as responsive as possible.' A plausible enough position perhaps, except
that Aboriginal people had categorically rejected it, and for compelling
reasons based on long and bitter experience.
Had the LRCC devoted space to following through on its admission
that Aboriginal control over criminal justice was the only viable resolu-
tion, it could have then arrogated to itself the important and useful role of
designing legal strategies to mediate the interaction of Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal legal systems. In my limited experience, concerns about
what might loosely be called "conflict of laws" between future aboriginal
justice systems and the dominant system invariably emerge as an objec-
tion to aboriginal control over criminal justice. Exploration of this
question by the LRCC could have been a very constructive step toward
assuaging fears and debunking misconceptions in non-aboriginal sectors
about the implications of self-government in the domain of criminal law.
It would have preserved a function for the Commission consistent with
its declared advocacy of Aboriginal autonomy, though it could only be
accomplished at the expense of becoming a bit player in the larger drama
of legal transformation.
In the end, the Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice
steered away from the radical implications of its own endorsement of
Aboriginal autonomy and focussed its energies on a series of modifica-
tions to the existing system. Whose interests were served by choosing the
path of reform over transformation? It may have served the interests of the
37. Kaiser, supra, note 36 at 93.
38. Ibid.
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government by effectively marginalizing the self-government option,
though as an independent agency accommodation of government inter-
ests is putatively not the role of the Commission. It may have served the
interests of unnamed parties, organizations and 'experts', but the identi-
ties and opinions of these players are never articulated in the Commission's
Report. It is far from evident that it served the interests of Aboriginal
peoples themselves, given that the Report records a virtually unanimous
rejection of a reformist strategy and an insistence that Aboriginal au-
tonomy is the only satisfactory response to the problem.39
From what I can see, the only unambiguous beneficiary of the
proposals made in the Report onAboriginalPeoples and Criminal Justice
was the LRCC. The Commission openly resisted the call to abandon its
belief in the perfectibility of the Criminal Code and related statutes,
especially since "[w]e at the Commission have devoted much of the past
twenty years to exploring many of these deficiencies. ' 40 Like some kind
of obsessive legal alchemist driven mad by years of laboratory games, the
Commission could not give up the job even as they conceded that the
premise was false and the work futile. In so doing, the Commission
revealed itself as aware of, yet imprisoned by, its own bureaucratic and
legalistic impulses.
Perhaps the best indicator of the LRCC's narrow conception of reform
is revealed in their own criteria for gauging success. Professor Teresa
Scassa notes in her survey of the LRCC's final Annual Report in 199141
that the Commission identified the following four measures of its own
influence: legislative achievements,judicial decisions, changing conduct
of officials, and public education.42 The first two categories require no
elaboration here. Examples given by the LRCC of its effect on the
conduct of officials were its projects on court unification in the family and
criminal courts, use of videotaped confessions, and a relatively modest
restructuring of the criminal prosecution division of the British Columbia
39. Members of the Commission who participated in the process have told me that the Report
was favourably received by at least some Aboriginal participants. I have not conducted a
systematic survey of the response in the Aboriginal communities to the Report, so I cannot
comment either way.
40. Supra, note 24 at 3.
41. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Twentieth Annual Report, 1990-91 (Ottawa:
LRCC, 1991).
42. Ibid., at Table of Contents.
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Ministry of the Attorney General.43 Achievements in public education
mainly took the form of free distribution of reports and working papers
to the public.44 The Commission does devote considerable space to
reviewing the results of a questionnaire it distributed to over 4,000judges,
lawyers, law professors, police and the public soliciting responses to
proposals contained in its booklet Police Powers: Highlights of Recom-
mendations. Curiously, theAnnual Report does not indicate what, if any,
changes were made in light of the feedback received. It does declare that
"[t]he number of completed questionnaires .... some with very thoughtful
comments, reinforces the Commission's belief that Canadians are inter-
ested in reforming the laws of criminal procedure. '45 Given the constitu-
ency who were invited to participate, and the fact that they were not
choosing criminal law from an array of possible priorities, the LRCC's
conclusion on this point can best be described as somewhat self-serving.
As Scassa concludes, "[t]he measures of success used by the LRCC in
1991 reflect a very narrow and limited conception of its [law reform]
mandate." 46
If there is any merit to my contention that the LRCC predominantly
(though not exclusively) served its own interests, the question we must
ask ourselves is how to avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future.
Let me begin'by trying to make a virtue of necessity. The LRCC is no
longer. While I would not have called for its abolition, we now have the
possibility of dispersing law reform initiatives to a constellation of
relatively disconnected actors who share no common institutional inter-
est in promoting a particular vision of law. It is important to say
"possibility" and not "certainty" because much depends on how the
participants are selected and who sets the agenda. If the powers that be
decide to anoint a select group of "legal experts" as the core of a new
unofficial law reform commission, I predict that a common institutional
interest will eventually coalesce around the chosen participants and the
pattern I have described above will reproduce itself. What follows are a
few proposals which I hope will stunt the re-emergence of a self-
43. Supra, note 41 at 21-23. Interestingly, the LRCC cites as one of its accomplishments the
establishment of a disclosure court in Vancouver, pursuant to recommendations made by the
British Columbia Justice Reform Committee in 1988. The link between this project and the
work of the LRCC seems to be that the Vancouver project was modelled on a similar pilot
project undertaken in Montreal in 1975, which in turn was initiated as a result of proposals made
in 1974 by the LRCC's Working Paper 4, Discovery in Criminal Cases.
44. Supra, note 4lat 24-25.
45. Ibid., at 25.
46. Supra, note 4 at 6.
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interested institutional vehicle for a few legal academics and facilitate the
emergence of a more inclusive and socially responsible and responsive
reform mechanism.
V. Reforming Law Reform
1. Agenda
I deliberately refrain here from supplying a list of subject areas that I think
are ripe for law reform initiatives. This is not for lack of ideas, but rather
because letting lawyers set the agenda for law reform is the first step
toward entrenching the interests of lawyers in the direction of reform. In
my view, subject areas of future investigation should be set by inviting
submissions from public interest groups across Canada.47 Preference
should be given to proposals by groups which currently have few
resources with which to command the attention of Parliament. My not-so-
secret assumption (and hope) is that this will yield topics that are relevant
to those who are relatively disadvantaged in Canada, and perhaps
subjects that both challenge us to think creatively about the scope and
utility (or disutility) of law.
A related advantage to a grassroots approach is that it provides a
"reality check" on what the real problems are. Professor Mary Jane
Mossman recently provided an insightful illustration of the dangers of
relying on litigation to provide the cues for the future direction of reform
in the family law context.4" As Professor Mossman demonstrates, law
reformers over the last twenty years frequently let case law generated by
appellate courts determine where and how to target reform efforts. Many
of the cases that reached the higher courts involved divorcing partners
where significant property was potentially available for division. Public
outcry over judicial decisions that refused to recognize women's unpaid
economic contributions as capable of creating property entitlements 49 led
reformers to focus attention on rectifying the laws of property division.
47. In fact, the LRCC's First Annual Report outlines a similar plan for using public
consultation as a means of setting the agenda. It admits that their research into family law was
prompted by public demand rather than through internal processes. It is also telling that the
LRCC commitment to family law was short lived, and eventually discarded as criminal law
took over the agenda. First Annual Report, 1971-72, supra, note 5 at 4.
48. Mary Jane Mossman, "Running Hard to Stand Still: The Paradox of Family Law
Reform", the 1993 Read Lecture, Dalhousie Law School, October 28, 1993 (on file with
author), at 10-17.
49. The most notorious case probably remains Murdoch v. Murdoch (1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d)
367 (S.C.C.).
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Whatever benefits these reforms may have conferred on members of the
propertied classes,50 they did little to alleviate the hardship faced by
women leaving marriages where there was little property to share. Had
law reformers taken their cue from a more representative sampling of
divorcing couples than simply those who litigate, they might have
generated a rather different agenda for action.
As the foregoing discussion evinces, I do not envisage a law reform
process that is non-partisan and disinterested. This is because I maintain
that law reform has never been non-partisan and disinterested, though it
has succeeded at various points in convincing others that the interests of
the LRCC are the interests of Canadian society at large.
2. Participants
I am not so selfless as to suggest that lawyers be entirely excluded from
the process, but I would, however, insist that legal academics be selected
on the basis of experience and interest in the field, rather than because
their ignorance of the area gives them the appearance of impartiality. I
would expect lawyers to play a somewhat humbler role than they have in
the past. In my world of reformed reform, lawyers would not merely
consult affected parties en route to designing a solution, they would work
alongside affected parties, take instruction and advice from them and
negotiate with them about how best law can be fashioned to accomplish
social goals. The way I see it, law reform is the occupation of everyone
who agitates for social change, to the extent that change often contains a
legal component. Those who go under the name "law reformers" hold
themselves out as possessing unique expertise in the mechanics of
translating political demands into legal form. In other words, law reform-
ers are just a specialized group of lobbyists; why not allocate those skills
to those most in need of advocacy? Yes, lawyers also have important
contributions to make to the substance of the legal change, but I take
exception to the notion that lawyers' substantive views occupy a privi-
leged position simply because they come from the mouths of lawyers.
Part of the inspiration for this approach comes from my understanding
of the coalition of national women's groups, legal activists and front line
workers who worked together a couple of years ago to formulate a
proposal on the new sexual assault legislation.51 Professor SheilaMcIntyre,
a LEAF 52 participant on the working group, remarked afterwards how
guaranteeing equal voice to each participant about the content of a new
50. Mossman, supra, note 46 at 14.
51. See Criminal Code, s. 273.1.
52. Legal Education and Action Fund.
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law opened up possibilities that we lawyers alone, with our self-imposed
(and self-validating) assumptions about what one can do with law, might
never have arrived at. The key was in sharing power and authority to
speak about what laws should say, and prying open the legal imagination
to work out how it could be done.13 This is a lesson from which we could
all benefit.
3. Objectives and Methods
Success in law reform should not and cannot be measured by how many
laws were passed, how many reports were passed out, how many times
the LRCC was cited in a Supreme Courtjudgment, orin the reconfiguration
of the sites of legal decision making. All of these indicia may or may not
be interesting bits of information but they do not come close to answering
the only question that matters when it comes to a law reform initiative:
does it work? I endorse Samek's assertion that the efficacy of institutions
such as law reform commissions "must be judged in human terms and in
regard to human ends." 54
Returning to a point raised earlier, it is naive in the extreme to believe
that the complex array of forces that create and sustain social injustice can
be resolved by the stroke of legislative pen. That is not to say that
legislative intervention is not a necessary or important component of
change, but rather that it is partial and must be constantly monitored
against the backlash of forces that will inevitably (and with a greater or
lesser degree of self-consciousness) operate to neutralize the potential
effect of legislative reform. For example, in 1983 many feminists
advocated relocating the Criminal Code offences of rape and indecent
assault from the Part dealing with offences against public morals, to the
Part dealing with offences against the person. A significant component of
the amendments involved redefining the offences under the category of
assault and renaming it "sexual assault". It was hoped that this transpo-
sition would de-emphasize the legal obsession with penetration as a
measure of harm, and would also accentuate sexual assault as a crime of
violence. Ten years later, the results are ambiguous at best. Anecdotal
reports suggest that while the definition of sexual assault does not focus
on penetration, courts still do in assessing the severity of the harm for
sentencing purposes; patterns in sentencing also reveal that it is not
necessarily being taken any more seriously now that it is labelled as
53. See Sheila McIntyre, "Redefining Reformism: The Consultations that Shaped Bill C-49",
in Julian Roberts and Renate Mohr, Confronting SexualAssault in Canada: A Decade of Legal
and Social Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).
54. Samek, supra, note 2 at 426.
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assault.5 5 Instead of understanding that the violation cannot be measured
simply by the distance travelled in vaginal penetration, some judges take
the message that sexual assault as a whole is a less serious crime because
it encompasses conduct that does not involve penetration. Finally, some
feminists have challenged the theoretical legitimacy of characterizing
sexual assault as a crime of violence simpliciter,16 a move which implic-
itly calls into question the wisdom of lumping it in with the non-sexual
assault provisions under the Criminal Code. None of this should be
interpreted to mean that it was wrong to reclassify sexual offences in
1983, but rather to suggest that one cannot underestimate the ability of
existing power structures to resist and subvert reformist measures.
What this means is that the targets of law reform will hardly ever be
amenable to a "one shot" cure, be- it a legislative amendment or a
favourable mention in a Supreme Court of Canada judgment. If one is
serious about achieving genuine reform, the approach must be multi-
modal and longitudinal. In other words, the problem must be tackled on
a number of levels and monitored over time to see what works, what
doesn't, and what responses become appropriate at later stages. In terms
of reform modalities, at least three types merit attention:
a) doctrine;
b) pilot projects;
c) actors in the legal system.
As noted earlier, law reform efforts have almost exclusively focused
on doctrinal analysis as the basis for legislative change. To the extent that
doctrinal research is retained as an activity of law reform, I would argue
for a pluralistic approach that encompasses gender, race, class, ability and
other factors, in addition to the traditional positivistic perspective that has
informed (if not defined) the LRCC's method in the past.
With respect to the second category, I suggest that pilot projects are a
fine way of translating theory into practice. I believe that the Winnipeg
Family Violence Court (FVC) project is a particularly noteworthy
example of law reform in action. The idea of creating a specialized court
to deal with issues of woman, child and elder abuse was developed in
consultation with judges, the federal Department of Justice, provincial
Family Services, the Mfinister of the Status of Women and thirty Winnipeg
agencies operating in the field. The Court is staffed by self-selected
prosecutors and judges who allocate a portion of their total work time to
55. On sentencing for sexual assault in Nova Scotia, see Issues in Sexual Assault Sentencing
in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Nova Scotia Advisory Council on the Status of Women, June 1991).
56. See, e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, "Sex and Violence: A Perspective", in Feminism
Unmodifled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) at 85-92.
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the FVC. Under the regular system, the prosecution of family violence,
and particularly woman assault, was a frustrating and largely futile
experience for all concerned. Women felt victimized by the process;
some were reluctant to testify out of fear and/or hope of reconciliation,
which in turn led to prosecutors becoming jaded and withdrawing cases.
Even when convictions were obtained, sentences were seen as inappro-
priate or too lenient.
In the two and half years since the creation of the FVC, the number of
cases coming to court has increased, the average time for processing has
dropped, the guilty plea and conviction rate has gone up, and a higher
percent of assailants have received court mandated treatment as part of
their sentence. 7 Victims appear to be more willing to engage the justice
system since the inception of the Court because the justice system is
responding more effectively to their needs. Institutional appraisal of
prosecutorial success within the FVC is not based solely in terms of
conviction rate; the responsiveness of the system to the self-identified
priorities of the complainant is also taken into account. This shift appears
to have eased the antagonism that too often marred relations between
prosecutors and complainants who were reluctant to testify against their
batterers.
At the same time, unemployed and Aboriginal men are significantly
over-represented in the FVC, much as they were before the Court was set
up,5" suggesting that the overarching class and race bias of the criminal
justice system is reproduced more or less intact in the FVC. It is still too
early to measure the effect of the Court on the recidivism rate of batterers.
However, Principal Investigator, Professor Jane Ursel, indicates that the
new Court has placed increased pressure on the correctional system,
which in turn will require restructuring to adjust to its new work load. The
inference is that the objective of reducing the incidence of family violence
will require follow up treatment after the judicial process has run its
course. Professor Ursel stresses that the "ripple-effect view of social
change suggests that when one part of a system is reformed it either
57. See generally, E. Jane Ursel, "The Family Violence Court ofWinnipeg" (1992), 21 Man.
L.J. 100.
58. Jane Ursel, A Comparative Study ofSentencing in the Specialized and General Criminal
Courts in Winnipeg (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Criminology Research Centre, 1992),
Table 4 "Characteristics of Suspect by Data Set", at 19.
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succeeds in forcing change throughout the system or the initial reform is
seriously compromised. '59 As a first step, then, the Court is an unprec-
edented breakthrough, and the knowledge gained through the experiment
provide information about the achievements and failures of the existing
program as well as guidance for future reforms.
Now it seems to me that a project like this is worth more to victims of
battering partners than a dozen law reform commission reports calling for
an anti-stalking law, or indeed the anti-stalking law itself. Institutional
reform is law reform, either as a necessary prerequisite to effective
legislative reform or as a solution in itself.
As for the category labelled "actors in the legal system", what I have
in mind are primarily law enforcement officials, judges and administra-
tive decision makers. I can only reiterate my earlier point that who
interprets and implements the law and how they do it have profound
effects on what the law is. At least two ways of channelling reform
through these agents are via the appointments process and through
educational programs. Much has already been written in favour of re-
vamping the process of judicial appointments, and I am not certain what
more can be added at this point. Nevertheless, my impression is that much
work remains to be done with respect to the process of selection for
administrative appointments and the education of police, judges and
administrative decision makers.
Finally, whatever methods are deployed to achieve reform, a critical
determinant of success is information. Without research into the impact
of any reform initiative, the dynamic of law reform has no rudder to guide
it. Professor Mossman notes that no systematic follow-up data has been
collected to measure the real impact of family law reform legislation in
Canada. She contrasts this state of neglect with Australia, where the
Australian Institute of Family Studies undertook to monitor the effect of
its 1975 family law reform legislation. According to Professor Mossman,
"ten years later, the Institute had significant data about the practical
impact of legislative principles concerning property and support on
divorcing spouses, data which was useful both for assessing the problems
andfor designing solutions."6 The need for longitudinal studies about the
consequences of law reform initiative seems painfully obvious, but it was
a need that seemed to elude the LRCC.
59. Ursel, supra, note 58 at 3.
60. Mossman, supra, note 48 at 16.
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VI. Conclusion
I believe that the lessons one can take from the legacy of the LRCC is that
its approach to its mandate was both too modest and too grandiose; too
modest in its understanding of what constitutes law and reform, and too
grandiose about the value of pursuing its narrow vision of law reform.
Having begun my discussion with a reference to Robert Samek, I would
like to finish with a quote from his article:
"Social" law reform cannot be delegated to any institution, let alone to
institutions dominated by lawyers. Itis an ongoing process which involves
all those human beings who seek to change social practices which may
raise doubts about the humanity, justice or efficiency of the established
legal system. In a highly institutionalized and legalized society, such as
Canada, it will require the aid of legal institutions, but its primary
motivation must remain "human." 61
Robert Samek wrote those words fifteen years ago. I think it fair to say
that the LRCC could not and did not pursue the course advocated by
Professor Samek. Instead, it become something of a rarefied lobby group
for legal academics. The government has removed the institutional
impediment by abolishing the institution. Our challenge is to avoid
resurrecting it and to prevent our own legalism from ossifying any future
attempts at constructive social law reform. We now have a second chance
to take Samek seriously; I propose that we take it.
As the Conference drew to a close, a Department of Justice observer was
invited to comment on the proceedings. She indicated that the Depart-
ment has been sustaining its law reform activities since the demise of the
LRCC through in-house work and external contract work. She further
stated that the Department is advancing a proposal for a long term law
reform program withfourbasic components: in house research; collabo-
rative arrangements with provincial bodies, academics and professional
law bodies; block funding for external projects; and a consultation
process aimed at soliciting participation from a broader array of stake-
holders. It would appear that this proposal was formulated by the
Department of Justice prior to the Conference.
61. Samek, supra, note 2 at435.
